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A Unifying Framework for Manipulation Problems ∗
Dusˇan Knop† Martin Koutecky´‡ Matthias Mnich§
Abstract
Manipulation models for electoral systems are a core research theme in social choice theory; they
include bribery (unweighted, weighted, swap, shift, . . . ), control (by adding or deleting voters or candi-
dates), lobbying in referenda and others.
We develop a unifying framework for manipulation models with few types of people, one of the most
commonly studied scenarios. A critical insight of our framework is to separate the descriptive complexity
of the voting rule R from the number of types of people. This allows us to finally settle the computational
complexity of R-Swap Bribery, one of the most fundamental manipulation problems. In particular, we
prove that R-Swap Bribery is fixed-parameter tractable when R is Dodgson’s rule and Young’s rule,
when parameterized by the number of candidates. This way, we resolve a long-standing open question
from 2007 which was explicitly asked by Faliszewski et al. [JAIR 40, 2011].
Our algorithms reveal that the true hardness of bribery problems often stems from the complexity of
the voting rules. On one hand, we give a fixed-parameter algorithm parameterized by number of types
of people for complex voting rules. Thus, we reveal that R-Swap Bribery with Dodgson’s rule is much
harder than with Condorcet’s rule, which can be expressed by a conjunction of linear inequalities, while
Dodson’s rule requires quantifier alternation and a bounded number of disjunctions of linear systems.
On the other hand, we give an algorithm for quantifier-free voting rules which is parameterized only
by the number of conjunctions of the voting rule and runs in time polynomial in the number of types
of people. This way, our framework explains why Shift Bribery is polynomial-time solvable for the
plurality voting rule, making explicit that the rule is simple in that it can be expressed with a single
linear inequality, and that the number of voter types is polynomial.
1 Introduction
Problems of manipulation, bribery and control constitute a fundamental part of computational social choice.
Many such problems are known to be NP-hard (or worse). However, their input can naturally be partitioned
into several parts, like the number of voters, the number of candidates, and others. This motivates the study
of such problems by the powerful tools of parameterized complexity. One of the most fundamental parameters
is the number of candidates |C|, which in many real-life scenarios can be expected to be reasonably small.
A by-now classical example in this direction is the R-Swap Bribery problem, which takes as input an
election consisting of a set C of candidates and a set V of voters with their individual preference lists ≻v
(for v ∈ V ), which are total orders over C. Additionally, for each voter v ∈ V and each pair of consecutive
candidates c ≻v c
′, there is some cost σv(c, c′) ∈ Z of swapping the order of c and c′ in ≻v. The objective
is to find a minimum-cost set of swaps of consecutive candidates in the preference lists in order to make
a designated candidate c⋆ ∈ C the winner of the thus-perturbed election under a fixed voting rule R.
This problem was introduced by Elkind et al. [EFS09] and has since been studied for many classical
voting rules R [DS12, FRRS14, KKM17c, SFE17]. In particular, its computational complexity has been
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thoroughly analyzed with respect to the number of candidates |C|. The observation that |C| is often small
motivated the search for fixed-parameter algorithms for R-Swap Bribery parameterized by |C|, which are
algorithms that run in time f(|C|) · nO(1) for some computable function f , here n denotes the size of the
input election; if such an algorithm exists, we then say that the problem is fixed-parameter tractable with
respect to the parameter |C|.
Despite the problem’s importance, for a long time, only the “uniform cost” case of R-Swap Bribery was
known to be fixed-parameter tractable for various voting rules, parameterized by the number of candidates;
here, uniform cost refers to the special case that all voters have the same cost function, that is, σv ≡ σ for all
v ∈ V . This is a fundamental result due to Dorn and Schlotter [DS12], who showed that R-Swap Bribery
with uniform cost can be solved in time 22
|C|O(1)
· nO(1) for all voting rules R that are “linearly describable”.
Many classical voting rules are indeed linearly describable, like any scoring protocol, Copelandα, Maximin,
or Bucklin.
Recently, Knop et al. [KKM17c] gave the first fixed-parameter algorithms for R-Swap Bribery for
general cost functions for most voting rulesR studied in the literature (scoring protocol, Copelandα, Maximin,
Bucklin etc.), thereby removing the uniform cost assumption. This way, they resolved a long-standing open
problem. Moreover, their algorithm runs in time 2|C|
O(1)
· nO(1) for many rules R, and thus improves the
double-exponential run time by Dorn and Schlotter. Their key idea was to reduce the problem to so-called
n-fold integer programming, which allowed them to solve the problem efficiently for bounded number of
candidates despite their integer program having an unbounded number of variables. Their approach also
solved R-Swap Bribery for R being the Kemeny rule, even for general cost functions, though the Kemeny
rule is not known to be linearly describable (cf. [FHH11, p. 338]). However, this does not apply for Dodgson’s
and Young’s rules.
1.1 The challenge
Even so, there are some notable voting rules R for which the complexity of R-Swap Bribery remained open
even in the uniform cost case. This includes the Dodgson rule and the Young rule. Those rules are based
on the notion of Condorcet winner, which is a candidate who beats any other candidate in a head-to-head
contest. The Condorcet voting rule is very natural and dates back to the 18th century; however, clearly there
exist elections without a Condorcet winner. In such a situation one proclaims those candidates as winners
who are “closest” to being a Condorcet winner; different notions of closeness then yield different voting rules:
• Closeness measured as the of number of swaps in voter’s preference orders defines the Dodgson rule.
• Closeness measured as the number of voter deletions defines the Young rule.
Thus, a candidate c is a Dodgson winner if s/he can be made a Condorcet winner by a minimum number of
swaps in the voter’s preference orders over all candidates; analogously for the Young rule and voter deletions.
Kemeny rule1,
When considering R-Swap Bribery, the Dodgson rule and the Young rule are much more complicated
to handle than other rules; the reasons are several. First, for many voting rules R, the winner of an election
can be found in polynomial time, and solving this winner determination problem is certainly a necessary
subtask when solving R-Swap Bribery. However, for R ∈ {Dodgson, Young, Kemeny}, already winner
determination is NP-hard, and so even verifying a solution (that c⋆ is indeed the winner of the perturbed
election) is intractable. However, for R ∈ {Dodgson, Young}, already winner determination is NP-hard,
and so even verifying that c⋆ is indeed the winner of the perturbed election is intractable. In fact, winner
determination for these voting rules is complete for parallel access to NP [HSV05, HHR97, RSV03], denoted
P
NP
|| -complete
2. Second, for more than 25 years the winner determination problem for the Dodgson rule and
1Faliszewski [FHH09] give a fixed-parameter algorithm for the R-Bribery problem when R =Kemeny; R-Bribery is, in a
sense, simpler than R-Swap Bribery because in Bribery the cost of bribing a voter does not depend on how we bribe, while
in Swap Bribery the cost is the sum of costs for each performed swap.
2The class PNP
||
contains all problems solvable in polynomial time by a deterministic Turing machine which has access to an
NP oracle, but must ask all of its oracle queries at once (i.e., the queries can not depend on each other).
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Young rule was only known to be solvable by an ILP-based algorithm [BITT89] with doubly-exponential
dependence in |C|; a single-exponential algorithm is only known since recently [KKM17c]. Even though
winner determination for these rules turns out to be fixed-parameter tractable with parameter |C|, there
is a sharp difference: for the Kemeny rule, a simple procedure enumerating all |C|! possible preference
orders suffices to determine the winner, while for Dodgson and Young, only a double-exponential ILP-
based algorithm was known for a long time [BITT89] and a single-exponential algorithm is only known
recently [KKM17c]. This provides a sharp contrast to the Kemeny rule, for which simply enumerating all
|C|! possible preference orders suffices to determine the winner. Faliszewski et al. [FHH09] describe these
difficulties:
It is interesting to consider which features of Kemeny elections allow us to employ the above [ILP-based]
attack, given that the same approach does not seem to work for either Dodgson or Young elections. One
of the reasons is that the universal quantification implicit in Dodgson and Young elections is over an
exponentially large search space, but the quantification in Kemeny is, in the case of a fixed candidate set,
over a fixed number of options.
Thus, it is not clear how to solveR-Swap Bribery even for uniform cost with any fixed-parameter algorithm
for R being the Dodgson rule or the Young rule. These complications led Faliszewski et al. [FHH11] to
explicitly ask for the complexity of R-Swap Bribery parameterized by the number of candidates under
these rules.
1.2 Our contributions
We start by making a key observation about the majority of fixed-parameter algorithms forR-Swap Bribery
when |C| is small. A typical such result is an algorithm for R-Swap Bribery for R being Condorcet’s voting
rule. That algorithm uses two key ingredients:
1. There are at most |C|! preference orders of C, and hence each voter falls into one of |C|! types; thus, an
input election is expressible as a society s = (s1, . . . , s|C|!), where si is the number of voters of type i.
2. Expressing that a candidate c⋆ is a Condorcet winner is possible using a conjunction of |C| − 1 linear
inequalities in terms of s.
As those key properties hold almost universally for voting rules R, one might be tempted to think that if
there are many types of voters, the R-Swap Bribery problem must be hard, and if there are few types of
voters, the problem must be easy. However, two points arise as counter-evidence. First, very recently, Knop
et al. [KKM17c] showed that even if there are many types of voters who differ by their cost functions, the
R-Swap Bribery problem remains fixed-parameter tractable for a wide variety of voting rules R. Second,
as already mentioned, it was open since 2007 whether R-Swap Bribery with Dodgson’s and Young’s voting
rule are fixed-parameter tractable for few candidates, even for uniform cost functions.
From voters and candidates to societies. Here, we take a novel perspective. We observe that the two key
ingredients (1) and (2) apply much more widely than for R-Swap Bribery; namely, they are also present
in many other manipulation, bribery and control problems. We therefore abstract away the specifics of such
problems and introduce general notions of “society”, “moves in societies”, and “winning conditions”. Let
τ ∈ N be the number of types of people (e.g., voters in an election or a referendum). A society s is simply
a non-negative τ -dimensional integer vector encoding the numbers of people of each type. A move m is
a τ2-dimensional integer vector whose elements sum up to zero; it encodes how many people move from
one type to another. A change ∆ is a τ -dimensional vector (typically associated with a move) encoding
the effect of a move on a society, such that s +∆ is again a society. Finally, a winning condition Ψ(s) is
a predicate encoding some desirable property of a society, such as that a preferred candidate has won or
that a preferred agenda was selected in a referendum. Specifically, we study winning conditions which are
describable by formulas in Presburger Arithmetic (PA). PA is a logical language whose atomic formulas are
linear inequalities over the integers, which are then joined with logical connectives and quantifiers. Thus,
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winning conditions describable by PA formulas widely generalize the class of linearly describable voting rules
by Dorn and Schlotter [DS12].
Our main technical contribution informally reads as follows:
Theorem 1 (informal). Deciding satisfiability of PA formulas with two quantifiers is fixed-parameter
tractable with respect to the dimension and length of formula, provided its coefficients and constants are
given in unary.
The importance of Theorem 1 arises from its applicability to the following general manipulation problem
that we introduce here. This general manipulation problem, which we call Minimum Move, captures that
many manipulation problems can be cast as finding a minimum move with respect to some objective function;
in particular, it encompasses the well-studied R-Swap Bribery problem. We study Minimum Move for
linear objective functions and winning conditions Ψ expressible with PA formulas of the form “∃∀”. For
all such Ψ, with the help of Theorem 1, we show that Minimum Move is fixed-parameter tractable for
combined parameter the descriptive complexity (length) of the winning condition Ψ and the number τ of
“types of people”, that is, it is fixed-parameter tractable for parameter lengthe of Ψ plus τ . As an important
special case, we obtain the first fixed-parameter algorithm for R-Swap Bribery for R the Dodgson rule
and the Young Rule with uniform costs. To this end, we model the winning condition of the Dodgson
rule and Young rules as a PA formula. For intuition, consider the Young rule: a candidate c⋆ is a Young
winner (with score d) if there exists a set V ⋆ ⊆ V of at most d voters such that c⋆ is a Condorcet winner
of the election (C, V \ V ⋆), and for all sets V ′ ⊆ V of at most d − 1 voters any other candidate c 6= c⋆
is not a Condorcet winner of the election (C, V \ V ′). This formula has one quantifier alternation, and its
length (for a fixed score d) is bounded by some function of |C|; finally we have to take a disjunction of such
formulas over all possible scores d. For a candidate set C, the number τ of types of people is bounded by |C|!.
Consequently, we finally settle the long-standing open question about the complexity of R-Swap Bribery
for R ∈ {Dodgson, Young}, that was explicitly raised by Faliszewski [FHH11]:
Theorem 2. R-Swap Bribery with uniform cost is fixed-parameter tractable parameterized by the number
of candidates for R being the Dodgson rule or the Young rule; it can be solved in time f(|C|) · |V |O(1) for
some computable function f .
Beyond this fundamental problem, we show that a host of other well-studied manipulation problems are
captured by our fixed-parameter algorithm for Minimum Move:
Corollary 3. For R ∈ {Dodgson, Young}, the following problems are fixed-parameter tractable for uniform
costs when parameterized by the number |C| of candidates: R-$Bribery, R-CCDV/CCAV, R-Possible
Winner, and R-Extension Bribery.
Let us turn our attention to the parameter “number of types of people” τ . Our main contribution here
is the following:
Theorem 4 (informal). For any quantifier-free winning condition Ψ, Minimum Move can be solved in time
polynomial in the number of types and exponential only in the number of linear inequalities of Ψ.
Note that in many models of bribery and control, the number of potential types of people (i.e., types
that can occur in any feasible solution) is polynomial in the number of people on input. For example, in
Shift Bribery, every voter can be bribed to change their preferences order to one of |C| − 1 orders; thus
the number of potential types is (|C|− 1)|V |. Similarly, in CCAV / CCDV (constructive control by adding
or deleting voters), every voter has an active/latent bit; thus the number of potential types is 2|V |. Similar
arguments also work for Support Bribery where we change voters’ approval counts, and with a more
intricate argumentation also for some voting rules and Bribery and $Bribery. In this sense, the fact that
we need to consider |C|! potential voter types inR-Swap Bribery almost seems like an anomaly, rather than
a rule. In summary, the complexity of Minimum Move depends primarily on the descriptive complexity of
the winning condition Ψ, because in many cases the number of types of people is polynomially bounded.
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Another consequence of Theorem 1 are the first fixed-parameter algorithms for two important manip-
ulation problems beyond R-Swap Bribery. The Resilient Budget problem asks, for a given society
whether allocating budget B is sufficient in order to repel any adversary move of cost at most Ba with a
counter-move of cost at most B (so that the winning condition is still satisfied). Similarly, Robust Move
asks for a move of cost at most B which causes the winning condition to be satisfied even after any adversary
move of cost at most Ba. For formal definitions and results, cf. Sect. 4.2.
1.3 Interpretation of results
Intuitively, the results obtained with Theorem 1 can be interpreted as follows. Dodgson-Swap Bribery
is fixed-parameter tractable parameterized by |C|; however, this comes with at least two limitations as
compared to prior work for simpler voting rules R. First, our methods do not extend beyond the uniform
cost scenario, and this remains a major open problem. Second, our result requires the input election to
be given in unary, while prior work allows it to be given in binary (this is sometimes called the succinct
case [FHH09]). This is easily explained by the different descriptive complexities of the respective voting rules:
for example, while Condorcet’s voting rule can be formulated as a quantifier-free PA formula, formulating
Dodgson’s rule requires a long disjunction of formulas which use two quantifiers and a bounded number of
disjunctions.
Theorem 4 lets us discuss more specifically the complexity of various voting rules. For example, the
Plurality voting rule can be expressed with a single linear inequality encoding that a preferred candidate
obtained more points than the remaining candidates altogether. Thus, all problems which can be modeled
as Minimum Move are polynomial-time solvable with the Plurality voting rule. This interprets the re-
sult of Elkind et al. [EFS09, Theorem 4.1] that Plurality-Shift Bribery is polynomial-time solvable: the
number of potential voter types is polynomial, and Plurality has a simple description. Continuing, we may
compare R=Borda with R=Copeland. The winning condition for R=Borda can be described with |C| − 1
inequalities, while R=Copeland requires O(|C|2) inequalities. Thus Borda-Swap Bribery is solvable in
time |C|O(|C|
2) log |V |, while Copeland-Swap Bribery requires time |C|O(|C|
4) log |V |. Finally, all descrip-
tions of Kemeny’s voting rule we are aware of require |C|! inequalities, and thus result in Kemeny-Swap
Bribery being solvable in time |C|!(|C|!)
O(1)
log |V |. We do not claim these complexities to be best possible,
but conjecture the existence of lower bounds separating the various voting rules; in particular, we believe
that Kemeny-Swap Bribery requires double-exponential time.
Finally, our work provides a natural next step in unifying the many different models that have been
proposed for voting, bribing and manipulation problems. In this direction, Faliszewski et al. [FHH11] study
what happens when multiple bribery and manipulation actions can occur in an election; e.g., CCAV asks
for constructive control by adding voters while CCDV by deleting voters; similarly for CCAC and CCDC
for adding/deleting candidates. Faliszewski et al. unify those various (up to that point separately studied)
attacks. Similarly, Knop et al. [KKM17c] formulate the R-Multi Bribery problem, which also incorporates
swaps and perturbing approval counts. The problem we put forward in this paper, Minimum Move, in some
sense generalizes and simplifies all those “meta”-problems.
1.4 Related work
We have reviewed most of the relevant computational social choice work already. However, there seems
to be some confusion in the literature that deserves clarification. The paper of Faliszewski et al. [FHH09]
pioneering the concept of bribery in elections indeed considers the voting rules Kemeny, Dodgson and Young,
and provides a fixed-parameter algorithm for Kemeny-Bribery. There are three features of their paper that
we wish to discuss.
First, turning their attention to Dodgson-Bribery, they write:
Applying the integer programming attack for the case of bribery within Dodgson-like election systems [...]
is more complicated. These systems involve a more intricate interaction between bribing the voters and
then changing their preferences. For Dodgson elections, after the bribery, we still need to worry about
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the adjacent switches within voters’ preference lists that make a particular candidate a Condorcet winner.
[...] This interaction seems to be too complicated to be captured by an integer linear program, but building
on the flavor of the Bartholdi et al. [BITT89] ILP attack we can achieve the following: Instead of making
p a winner, we can attempt to make p have at most a given Dodgson or Young score.
They call this problem DodgsonScore-Bribery and provide positive results for it. Notice, however, that
finding a bribery which makes c⋆ have a certain Dodgson score does not prevent another candidate to have
a lower score and winning the bribed election. Thus, solving DodgsonScore-Bribery can be very far from
the desired result.
Second, the authors then observe that a brute force approach enumerating all |V ||C|! briberies solves
the Dodgson-Bribery problem in polynomial time for constantly many candidates; however, theirs is not a
fixed-parameter algorithm for parameter |C|.
Third, they then introduce another voting system called Dodgson′, which is similar to Dodgson, and
provide a fixed-parameter algorithm for winner determination. However, as in the case of Dodgson-Bribery,
they do not provide a fixed-parameter algorithm for Dodgson′-Bribery.
The issue is then that a subsequent paper of Falisezwski et al. [FHH11] claims that the Dodgson rule is
“integer-linear-program implementable” and that this implies a certain election control problem generalizing
Bribery to be fixed-parameter tractable [FHH11, Theorem 6.2]. We believe the authors do not sufficiently
differentiate between determining the winner with one ILP, as is the case for most simple voting rules, and
with multiple ILPs, as is the case for Dodgson. Thus, we believe there is no evidence that the Dodgson
rule is “integer-linear-program implementable”. Yet, this may be possible and this question still deserves
attention. Whatever the reason, we are convinced that their [FHH11, Theorem 6.1] does not hold for
R=Dodgson. Hence, we believe that ours are the first fixed-parameter algorithms for any Bribery-like
problem for R ∈ {Dodgson, Young}.
2 Preliminaries
Let m,n be integers. We define [m,n] := {m,m+ 1, . . . , n} and [n] := [1, n]. Throughout, we reserve bold
face letters (e.g. x,y) for vectors. For a vector x its i-th coordinate is xi.
Next, we provide notions and notations for R-Swap Bribery.
Elections. An election (C, V ) consists of a set C of candidates and a set V of voters, who indicate their
preferences over the candidates in C, represented via a preference order ≻v which is a total order over C.
We often identify a voter v with their preference order ≻v. Denote by rank(c, v) the rank of candidate c
in ≻v; v’s most preferred candidate has rank 1 and their least preferred candidate has rank |C|. For distinct
candidates c, c′ ∈ C, write c ≻v c
′ if voter v prefers c over c′.
Swaps. Let (C, V ) be an election and let ≻v∈ V be a voter. For candidates c, c
′ ∈ C, a swap s = (c, c′)v
means to exchange the positions of c and c′ in ≻v; denote the perturbed order by ≻
s
v. A swap (c, c
′)v is
admissible in ≻v if rank(c, v) = rank(c
′, v) − 1. A set S of swaps is admissible in ≻v if they can be applied
sequentially in ≻v, one after the other, in some order, such that each one of them is admissible. Note that
the perturbed vote, denoted by ≻Sv , is independent from the order in which the swaps of S are applied. We
extend this notation for applying swaps in several votes and denote it V S . We specify v’s cost of swaps by
a function σv : C × C → Z.
Voting rules. A voting rule R is a function that maps an election (C, V ) to a subset W ⊆ C, called the
winners. A candidate c ∈ C is a Condorcet winner if any other c′ ∈ C \ {c} satisfies
∣∣{≻v∈ V | c ≻v c′}
∣∣ >∣∣{≻v∈ V | c′ ≻v c}
∣∣; then we say that c beats c′ in a head-to-head contest. The Young score of c ∈ C is
the size of the smallest subset V ′ ⊆ V such that c is a Condorcet winner in (C, V \ V ′). Analogously, the
Dodgson score of c ∈ C is the size of the smallest admissible set of swaps S such that c is a Condorcet winner
in (C, V S). Then, c is a Young (Dodgson) winner if it has minimum Young (Dodgson) score.
We aim to solve the following problem:
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R-Swap Bribery
Input: An election (C, V ), a designated candidate c⋆ ∈ C and swap costs σv : C × C → Z for
v ∈ V .
Find: A set S of admissible swaps of minimum cost so that c⋆ wins the election (C, V S) under
the rule R.
3 Moves in Societies and Presburger Arithmetic
Let τ ∈ N be the number of types of people.
Definition 5. A society is a non-negative τ -dimensional integer vector s = (s1, . . . , sτ ).
In most problems, we are interested in modifying a society by moving people between types.
Definition 6. A move is a vector m = (m1,1, . . . ,mτ,τ ) ∈ Z
τ2 .
Intuitively, mi,j is the number of people of type i turning type j.
Definition 7. A change is a vector ∆ = (∆1, . . . ,∆τ ) ∈ Z
τ whose elements sum up to 0. We say that ∆
is the change associated with a move m if ∆i =
∑τ
j=1mj,i −mi,j , and we write ∆ = ∆(m). A change ∆ is
feasible with respect to society s if s+∆ ≥ 0, i.e., if applying the change ∆ to s results in a society.
One more useful notion is that of a move costs vector:
Definition 8. A move costs vector is a vector c = (c1,1, . . . , cτ,τ ) in (N∪{+∞})
τ2 which satisfies the triangle
inequality, i.e., ci,k ≤ ci,j + cj,k for all distinct i, j, k.
Definition 9 ((c, k)-move). Let k ∈ N and c be a move costs vector. A movem is a (c, k)-move if c⊺m ≤ k.
Finally, we want to check that the society (e.g., resulting from applying some moves) satisfies a certain
desired condition. This condition depends on the problem we are modeling: in variants of bribery, it says
that a preferred candidate is elected as a winner or to be a part of a committee under a given voting rule; in
the context of lobbying, it says that a preferred agenda was selected. To allow large expressibility, we make
a very broad definition:
Definition 10. A winning condition of width τ is a predicate Ψ(s) with τ free variables.
3.1 Presburger Arithmetic
For two formulas Φ and Ψ, we write Φ ∼= Ψ to denote their equivalence.
Definition 11 (Presburger Arithmetic). Let
Pˆ0,(n0),δ,γ,α,β =
{
Ψˆ(x0)
}
be the set of quantifier-free Presburger Arithmetic (PA) formulas with n0 free variables x0 which are a
disjunction of at most δ conjunctions of linear inequalities a⊺x0 ≤ b, each of length at most γ, where
‖a‖∞ ≤ α and |b| ≤ β for each inequality. Then, let
P0,(n0),δ,γ,α,β =
{
Ψ(x0) | ∃Ψˆ(x0) ∈ Pˆ0,(n0),δ,γ,α,β : Ψˆ
∼= Ψ
}
be the set of PA formulas equivalent to some DNF formula from Pˆ0,(n0),δ,γ,α,β. Finally, let
Pk,n,δ,γ,α,β = {Ψ(x0) ≡ ∃/∀x1∃/∀x2 · · · ∃/∀xk : Φ(x0,x1, . . . ,xk)}
be the set of PA formulas with quantifier depth k, n0 free variables x0, and dimension n = (n0, n1, . . . , nk);
here, xi ∈ Z
ni for each i and Φ(x0, . . . ,xk) ∈ P0,(n),δ,γ,α,β with n =
∑k
i=1 ni. The length of Ψ(x0) is the
number of symbols it contains, which is polynomially bounded in (n, γ, δ). By ∃P and ∀P we denote the
sets of PA formulas whose leading quantifier is ∃ or ∀, respectively.
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∃/∀x1
∃/∀xk
...
(∨), δ
(∧), γ (∧), γ (∧), γ. . .
a1 · (x0, . . . ,xk) ≤ b1
ap · (x0, . . . ,xk) ≤ bp
... ≤ γ
≤ α ≤ β
Φ
Figure 1: Visualization of PA formula Ψ(x0) in DNF.
Example. A simple example of PA is the following formula.
Ψ(y) ≡ ∀x1x2∃z1z2z3 : (x1 + y = z3 ∧ y ≥ 0)∨(
3x1 + 10y − 3z1 ≤ 13 ∧ 2x2 + 5y − z2 ≤ 11
∧ x1 + 1y − z3 ≥ 9 ∧ z1 − z2 + 2z3 ≤ 6
)
Here k = 2,n = (1, 2, 3) , δ = 2, γ = 4, α = 10, and β = 13.
We study winning conditions Ψ(s) expressible in PA, and state our complexity results with respect to
the descriptive complexity of Ψ, which is its number of variables, quantifiers, logical connectives, and unary
encoding length of coefficients and constants.
Vocabulary. We express relevant definitions by simple PA formulas over integral variables and with integer
coefficients and constants:
• society(s) ≡ s ≥ 0 ∈ P0,(τ),0,τ,1,0,
• move(m) ∈ P0,(τ2),0,0,0,0,
• ∆ = ∆(m) is a linear map ∆i =
∑τ
j=1mj,i − mi,j ; thus if we let Ψ(m,∆) ≡ ∆ = ∆(m), then
Ψ(m,∆) ∈ P0,(τ+τ2),0,τ,1,0
• feasible(s,∆) ≡ (s+∆(m) ≥ 0 ∧ 1⊺∆ = 0) ∈ P0,(2τ),0,τ,2,0, and,
• (c, k)-move(m) ≡ c⊺m ≤ k ∈ P0,(τ),0,1,‖c‖∞,k.
We note that, for elections, our definition of winning condition generalizes the notion of “linearly-definable
voting rules” by Dorn and Schlotter [DS12]. Precisely, those rules belong to ∃P with k = 1; we will show
that Dodgson and Young are in ∃P with k = 2. Thus, our winning conditions capture an extensive set of
voting rules.
3.2 Modeling Problems as Minimum Move
We model moves in societies by the following general problem:
Minimum Move
Input: A society s, an objective function f : Zτ
2
→ Z, a winning condition Ψ.
Find: A move m minimizing f(m) s.t. Ψ(s+∆(m)) ∧ feasible(s,∆(m)).
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It models many well-studied problems:
Multi bribery. Knop et al. [KKM17c] introduce a generalization of various bribery problems called R-
Multi Bribery. Informally, we are given an election (C, V ) where each voter further has an approval count,
and is either active or latent the status of which can be changed at certain cost; likewise, there are costs for
perturbing their preference order or approval count. This problem generalizes Bribery, $Bribery, Swap
Bribery, Shift Bribery, Support Bribery, Extension Bribery, Possible Winner, Constructive
Control by Adding/Deleting Voters and other problems.
Notice that there are at most |C|! possible preference orders, at most |C| possible approval counts, and
2 states “active” or “latent”. Thus, there are at most τ ≤ 2|C| · |C|! potential types of voters, and we
can express the input election as a society s. A move costs vector c describing the costs of moving a voter
from one type to another is obtained by calculating (possibly using a shortest path algorithm) the least costs
based on the given cost functions. Let Ψ(s) be a PA formula which is satisfied if the preferred candidate wins
under the voting rule R in a society s. Then, a bribery of minimum cost in a R-Multi Bribery instance
can be modeled as solving Minimum Move with f(m) = c⊺m. This modeling, combined with Theorem 2
and Corollary 17, yields Corollary 3.
Multiwinner elections. Bredereck et al. [BFN+16] study the complexity of Shift Bribery in committee
elections, that is, in elections with multiple winners. The modeling is exactly the same as above, except for
the winning condition Ψ which will be a long disjunction over all committees which include the preferred
candidate.
Lobbying in referenda. Bredereck et al. [BCH+14] study the complexity of Lobbying in referenda. There,
voters cast ballots with their “yes”/“no” answers to issues. The task is to push an agenda, i.e., a certain
outcome. Again, voters fall into groups according to their ballots, the costs of changing their opinions forms
a move costs vector, and a winning condition Ψ expresses that the selected agenda succeeded.
4 Sentences With Two Quantifiers
We shall now introduce the building blocks of our proof of Theorem 1. Woods [Woo15] gives an algorithm
that efficiently converts any quantifier-free PA formula Φ into an equivalent DNF formula Φˆ of bounded
length:
Lemma 12 (Woods [Woo15, Proposition 5.1]). Let Φ(x) be a quantifier-free PA formula with x ∈ Zd
containing N inequalities, whose coefficients and right-hand sides are bounded in absolute value by α and
β, respectively. Then Φ(x) can be converted into an equivalent DNF formula Φˆ(x) with at most δ = NO(d)
disjunctions, each containing at most N conjunctions with the same bound on α and β.
It is often useful for the quantifiers of a PA formula to range over integer points of polyhedra, e.g. ∀x ∈ Q
(we do not write Q ∩ Zn for brevity, as we assume everything to be integer); again, our definition is not
restrictive by the fact that we can always rearrange:
Ψ(x0) ≡ ∃x1 ∈ Q1 · · · ∀/∃xk ∈ Qk : Φ(x0,x1, . . . ,xk) ≡
∃x1 · · · ∀/∃xk :
(
Φ(x0,x1, . . . ,xk)
∧
(x1 ∈ Q1 ∧ x3 ∈ Q3 · · · )∧
∨
(x2 6∈ Q2 ∨ x4 6∈ Q4 · · · )
)
Parametric ILP. A special case of PA are parametric ILPs, which can be viewed3 as deciding the sentence
∀x ∈ Zp : Ax ≤ b ∃y ∈ Zn : B(x,y) ≤ e,
where A ∈ Zℓ×p and B ∈ Zm×n are integer matrices. A consequence of an algorithm of Eisenbrand and
Shmonin [ES08] is the following:
3Parametric ILPs are typically viewed as ILPs with a varying right hand side, that is, deciding the sentence ∀b∃x : Ax ≤ b;
it is known that our formulation is equivalent, as shown by Crampton et al. [CGKW17], who call it ILP Resiliency.
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Corollary 13 ([ES08, Theorem 4.2], [CGKW17, Corollary 1]). Any parametric ILP whose entries of A,B,
b and e are given in unary, is fixed-parameter tractable when parameterized by n,m and p.
ILP and disjunctions. We shall use a folklore result about implementing disjunctions in ILP when the
domains of variables can be bounded. For that, we need another definition.
Definition 14 (B-bounded, B-small PA formula). Let Ψ(x0) ≡ ∃/∀x1 · · · ∃/∀xk : Φ(x0, . . . ,xk) be a PA
formula, and let ΨB(x0) ≡ ∃/∀x1 ∈ [−B,B]
n1 · · · ∃/∀xk ∈ [−B,B]
nk : Φ(x0, . . . ,xk). Then we say that
Ψ(x0) is B-bounded if
{x ∈ Zn0 | ΨB(x)} ∩ [−B,B]
n0 = {x ∈ Zn0 | Ψ(x)} ,
i.e., the set of feasible solutions does not change by restricting all quantifiers and free variables to the
corresponding box of size B.
Moreover, we say that any Ψ ∈ Pk,n,δ,γ,B,B is B-small if it is B-bounded, that is, its coefficients and
constants are bounded by B.
A special case are ILPs which are B-small; they correspond to PA formulas with k = 0 and δ = 0; for
such formulas we show:
Lemma 15 (ILP disjunctions [folklore]). Let Aix ≤ bi for i ∈ [d] be B-small ILPs with Ai ∈ Z
m×n for
each i ∈ [d]. Then, a (B2n)-small system Ax ≤ b with A ∈ Z(md+d+1)×(n+d) can be constructed in time
O
(
dm+ n+
∑d
i=1〈Ai, bi〉
)
such that
∃(x,y) ∈ Zn+d : A(x,y) ≤ b ⇐⇒ ∃x ∈ Zn :
∨
i∈[d]
Aix ≤ bi .
Proof. Let M = B2n, let yi for i ∈ [d] be binary variables, and consider the following system:
d∑
i=1
yi = 1
∧
yi ≥ 0, Aix ≤ bi +M(1− yi) for all i ∈ [d] .
Assume it has an integer solution y. Then there is an index i ∈ [d] such that yi = 1 and thus Aix ≤ bi + 0
holds; thus, the system Aix ≤ bi has an integer solution. In the other direction, assume that the system
Aix ≤ bi has a solution x; then let yi = 1. We shall prove that Ai′x ≤ bi′ +M holds for all i
′ 6= i. Since
Ai′x ≤ bi′ is B-small, each of its row sums has n terms which are a multiple of two numbers, each bounded
by B, and thus is at most B2n. Moreover, since yi = 1, we have yi′ = 0 and thus the right hand side is
bi′ +M and every assignment of x feasible for Aix ≤ bi satisfies it. Clearly, the new system has n + d
variables, md + d + 1 inequalities, is B-bounded and ‖A‖∞ = B
2n and thus it is (B2n)-small, and can be
constructed in the claimed time.
We now prove Theorem 1; we restate it in formal terms here:
Theorem 16 (formal version of Theorem 1). Let Ψ be a β-small P2,n,δ,γ,α,β sentence (i.e., without free
variables and thus n0 = 0). Then Ψ can be decided in time g(n, δ, γ) poly(α, β) for some computable function
g.
Proof. Let Ψ ≡ ∃x1∀x2 : Φ(x1,x2). Clearly, to decide Ψ we can instead decide ¬Ψ ≡ ∀x1∃x2 : ¬Φ(x1,x2).
Consider the formula ¬Φ(x1,x2): by Lemma 12, there exists an equivalent β-small DNF formula Φ¯(x1,x2)
such that the number of its disjunctions and conjunctions is a function of just the original δ and γ.
Thus, from now on focus on the case Ψ ≡ ∀x1∃x2 : Φ(x1,x2). Our next task is to construct an
instance of Parametric ILP equivalent to deciding Ψ. To do that, replace Φ(x1,x2) with Ξ(x1,x2) ≡
∃x3 : A(x1,x2,x3) ≤ b, where x3 is of dimension δ and the system of linear inequalities A(x1,x2,x3) ≤ b
has bounded length, coefficients and right sides. Now we use Lemma 15. Assume that Φ(x1,x2) is a
disjunction of δ linear systems, each of at most γ conjunctions, and by the assumptions of the theorem
we know that Ψ is β-small. Plugging into Lemma 15, we have B = β, d = δ, m = γ and n = n1 + n2,
and we obtain a formula ∃x3 : A(x1,x2,x3) ≤ b equivalent to Φ(x1,x2). Thus, we are left with deciding
∀x1∃(x2,x3) : A(x1,x2,x3) ≤ b with the following parameters:
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• The coefficients and right-hand sides ‖(A,b)‖∞ are bounded by some computable function f(n, δ, γ)·(αβ)
2.
• The dimensions of A are bounded by f(n, δ, γ).
Thus, we are in the setting of Corollary 13 and we can decide the above sentence by a fixed-parameter
algorithm.
Corollary 17. Let Ψ(x0) be a disjunction of D many β-small ∃P2,(τ,n1,n2),δ,γ,α,β formulas. Then
Minimum Move with objective f(x0) = c
⊺x0 and winning condition Ψ can be solved in time
g(τ, n1, n2, δ, γ) poly(D,α, β, c) for some computable function g.
Proof. Let Ψ ≡ Ψ1 ∨ · · · ∨ ΨD, and let Ξi(m) ≡ Ψi(s +∆(m)) ∧ (c, B)-move(m) ∧ feasible(∆(m), s), for
each i ∈ [D]. Now we need to perform binary search with parameter B on the sentence
∃mΨ(s+∆(m) ∧ (c, B)-move(m) ∧ feasible(∆(m), s) .
This sentence is obviously equivalent to
∃mΞ1(m) ∨ · · · ∨ ∃mΞD(m),
which can be decided by D application of Theorem 16. This is possible in the claimed time, as, for each
i ∈ [D], ∃mΞi(m) has quantifier depth 2, is β
′-small for β′ = poly(β, τ + n1 + n2, ‖c‖∞) and has dimension
n = (0, τ +n1, n2). A minimum move can then be constructed by coordinate-wise binary search; cf. [KQR10,
Thm. 4.1].
4.1 Application: Swap Bribery for the Dodgson Rule and Young Rule
We now prove Theorem 2 by giving our fixed-parameter algorithm forR-Swap Bribery withR the Dodgson
Rule or the Young Rule.
Proof of Theorem 2. Fix an instance (C, V, c⋆, σ) of R-Swap Bribery. As there are |C|! possible total
orders on C, each voter has one of these orders. Thus we view the election as a society s = (s1, . . . , s|C|!).
Let cswap be a move costs vector defined as ci,j =“swap distance between types i and j” (this is simply the
number of inversions between the permutations i and j [EFS09, Proposition 3.2]); observe that a society s
is in swap distance at most d from s′ if s′ = s +∆(m) and m is a feasible (cswap, d)-move for s. Moreover,
let cdel be defined as ci,0 = 1 for every type i and ci,j = +∞ for every two types i, j 6= 0, where 0 is a type
for latent voters; observe that s is in voter deletion distance at most d from s′ if s′ = s +∆(m) and m is a
(cdel, d)-move.
Our plan is to express the winning condition for R using a PA formula ΨDodgson(s) which is a disjunction
of polynomially many (in |V | and |C|) formulas from ∃P2,n,δ,γ,α,β, and then solve Minimum Move with
f(m) = σ⊺m and Ψ = ΨDodgson(s) using Corollary 17; recall that since the instance is uniform, we have
σv ≡ σ for all v ∈ V , and we let σ be the move costs vector obtained from σ. For ΨYoung, we proceed
analogously. In the end, we will verify that n, δ, γ are bounded by a function of |C|, and that α, β are
polynomial in the input size.
Expressing ΨDodgson and ΨYoung. The winning condition for candidate c
⋆ in both the Dodgson and
Young rule can be viewed as c⋆ being closest to being a Condorcet winner with respect to some distance
measure. Specifically, for the Dodgson rule, this distance is the number of swaps in the preference orders,
and in the Young rule, the distance is the number of voter deletions. For this reason, finding a bribery which
makes c⋆ a winner corresponds to finding a bribery which, for some d ∈ N, makes c⋆ be in distance d or less
from being a Condorcet winner, and, simultaneously, making every other candidate c 6= c⋆ be in distance at
least d from being a Condorcet winner.
Let us fix d ∈ N; later we will argue that we can go through all D relevant choices of d. First, we will
express the condition that in a society s, candidate c beats candidate c′ in a head-to-head contest:
beats(c, c′, s) ≡
∑
i:c≻ic′
si >
∑
i:c′≻ic
si,
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where ≻i is the preference order shared by all voters of type i. Then, it is easy to express that c
⋆ is a winner
in s under Condorcet’s rule:
ΦCondorcet(c, s) ≡
∧
c′ 6=c
beats(c, c′, s) .
Finally, we express that c⋆ is a Dodgson-winner with score d by ΨDodgson,d as follows:
ΨDodgson,d(s) ≡
(
∃m : (cswap, d)-move(m) ∧ feasible(∆(m), s)∧
ΦCondorcet(c
⋆, s+∆(m))
)
∧(
∀m : (cswap, d− 1)-move(m) ∧ feasible(∆(m), s)∧∧
c 6=c⋆
¬ΦCondorcet(c, s+∆(m))
)
Then, ΨDodgson ≡ ΨDodgson,1∨· · · ∨ΨDodgson,D. Clearly, ΨYoung,d is obtained simply by replacing cswap with
cdel.
Complexity. The number D of relevant choices of d is bounded by |C|2|V |: at most |C|2 swaps suffice for
any bribery of a single voter, and there are at most |V | voters, thus D ≤ |C|2|V | is a bound on the Dodgson
score of a candidate. For the Young score, D ≤ |V |.
Since for each d ∈ [D], ΨDodgson,d ≡ ∃m : Ξ1(m) ∧ ∀m : Ξ2(m) can be equivalently rewritten as
∃m∀m′ : Ξ1(m) ∧ Ξ2(m
′), it has quantifier depth 2, and thus belongs to ∃P2,n,δ,γ,α,β. Let us determine the
parameters:
• n is the vector of dimensions; thus n0 = τ = |C|! are the dimensions of a vector encoding a society, and
n1 = τ
2 = |C|!2 are the dimensions of a vector encoding a move.
• δ is the number of disjunctions, and it is polynomial in |C|,
• γ is the number of conjunctions, and it is polynomial in τ = |C|!,
• α is the largest coefficient, which is ‖cswap‖∞ ≤ |C|
2,
• β is the largest right-hand side, which is d ≤ |C|2|V |.
Thus, n, δ, γ are functions of the parameter |C| and α, β are polynomial in the size of the input election
(C, V, {≻v| v ∈ V }), as required by Corollary 17. Analogous analysis applies to ΨYoung,d.
Replacing cswap with 1
⊺ produces the winning condition for Dodgson′ as introduced by Faliszewski et
al. [FHH09]. Furthermore, it is interesting to consider voting rules obtained by replacing Condorcet’s rule
in the definition of Dodgson’s and Young’s rule. For example, the Majority rule also might not produce a
winner, and most rules (Copelandα, Scoring protocol etc.) allow ties. Let the score of a candidate be their
distance (swap, deletion, etc.) from being a (unique) winner under rule R. We remark that if we replace
Condorcet’s rule with R with a “simple” PA desciription, it corresponds to replacing ΦCondorcet in the proof
above, thus yielding fixed-parameter tractable algorithms for all such rules as well.
4.2 Application: Resilient and Robust Moves
Theorem 1 allows us to develop fixed-parameter algorithms for problems related to moves in society. Problem
Robust Move asks for a move that is robust to any adversary move of cost at most Ba:
Robust Move
Input: A society s, move costs vectors c and ca, a winning condition Ψ, budgets B,Ba ∈ N
Find: A (c, B)-move m such that for every adversary (ca, Ba)-move ma, Ψ(s+∆(ma) + ∆(m))
holds.
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The second problem, Resilient Budget, asks if a budget B suffices to counter any adversary move of
cost at most Ba. Crampton et al. [CGKW17] consider a specialization of this problem for R-Swap Bribery.
Resilient Budget
Input: A society s, move costs vectors c and ca, a winning condition Ψ, budgets B,Ba ∈ N
Find: Does for every adversary (ca, Ba)-movema exist a (c, B)-movem such that Ψ(s+∆(ma)+
∆(m))?
Theorem 18. Robust Move and Resilient Budget with Ψ ∈ P0,(n0),δ,γ,α,β can be solved in time
g(τ, n0, δ, γ)(α+ β +B +Ba + ‖c‖∞ + ‖ca‖∞)
O(1), that is, FPT parameterized by τ + n0 + δ + γ.
Proof. We apply Theorem 1 to decide the following formulas, which is clearly equivalent to deciding the
problems at hand:
Ψ(s)RB ≡∃m : feasible(s,∆(m)) ∧ (c, B)-move(m) ∧
∀ma : feasible(s+∆(m),∆(ma)) ∧ (ca, Ba)-move(ma) ∧
Ψ(s+∆(m) + ∆(ma))
Ψ(s)RM ≡∀ma : feasible(s,∆(ma)) ∧ (ca, Ba)-move(ma) ∧
∃m : feasible(s+∆(ma),∆(m)) ∧ (c, B)-move(m) ∧
Ψ(s+∆(m) + ∆(ma))
5 Polynomially Many Types
We now prove Theorem 4, which formally reads:
Theorem 19. Let Ψ(s) ∈ P0,(τ,n1),δ,γ,α,β be a winning condition. Minimum Move can be solved in time
g(γ, α)(τ + δ)O(1) log(s) for any linear function f(m) = c⊺m, where g is some computable function.
Proof. Since k = 0, Φ(y) is a disjunction of δ linear systems Aiy ≤ bi, with ‖Ai‖∞ ≤ α and with at most
γ rows, for every i ∈ [δ]. Thus we instead solve δ instances of Minimum Move with Φi(y) ≡ Aiy ≤ bi
and pick the best solution among them. So from now on assume that Φ(y) ≡ Ay ≤ b with ‖A‖∞ ≤ α and
A ∈ Zγ×τ .
Observe that A can have at most αO(γ) different columns. For two types i, j ∈ [τ ], we say they are
equivalent and write i ∼ j if the columns Ai and Aj are identical. Thus, the τ types of people fall into
C ≤ αO(γ) equivalence classes. For every type i ∈ [τ ], let C[i] = {j ∈ [τ ] | j ∼ i} be the equivalence class
containing i, and let A¯ ∈ Zγ×C be a matrix with, for every i ∈ [C], A¯i = Aj where j ∈ C[i]. Now, for every
type i ∈ [τ ], we shall create a reduced custom move costs vector ci ∈ NC
2
. For every j ∈ [C], i 6= j, let
cii,j = min
j′∈C[j]
ci,j′
be the cost of moving from i to the cheapest equivalent of j, and let cij,k = +∞ for any i 6= j, k ∈ [C]. Let
c¯ = (c1, . . . , cτ )
Then, consider the following ILP with variables x = (x1, . . . ,xτ ) ∈ ZτC ; we obtain the minimum move
m from its optimal solution by taking mi,j = x
i
j′ where j
′ ∼ j:
min c¯⊺x s.t.
∑
i=1,...,τ
A¯xi ≤ b,
∑
j=1,...,C
xij = si ∀i ∈ [τ ] .
This ILP is a combinatorial pre-n-fold IP ; by Knop et al. [KKM17a] (detailed in [KKM17b, Corollary 23]),
it can be solved in the claimed time.
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6 Discussion
We raise three important questions which naturally arise from this work. First, we ask whether our fixed-
parameter algorithm for {Dodgson,Young}-Swap Bribery with uniform cost extends to general cost func-
tions. This parallels [BCF+14, Challenge #2]. For much simpler voting rules an analogous result was
shown only recently [KKM17c]. We believe that if the answer is positive, proving it would require provid-
ing new powerful integer programming tools, in particular, some analogue of Theorem 1 for n-fold integer
programming, which is the engine behind the recent progress [KKM17c].
Second, can the run time of our algorithm be improved? This analogously recalls [BCF+14, Challenge
#1]. The run time of Corollary 17 is double-exponential in the dimension O(τ); thus Theorem 2 shows
that Dodgson-Swap Bribery is solvable in triple-exponential time in parameter |C|. We believe it can be
improved, but we are sceptical that it could be made single-exponential, and thus ask if a double-exponential
lower bound holds. A related question is to show lower bounds separating the complexity of R-Swap
Bribery for different voting rules such as Borda, Copeland and Kemeny.
Third, we note that, unlike most previous results, the run time of our algorithm depends polynomially
on the number |V | of voters. Many previous results solve the succinct variant of the problem (cf. Falizewski
et al. [FHH09]) and depend polynomially only on log |V |. Thus we ask whether {Dodgson,Young}-Swap
Bribery is fixed-parameter tractable also in the succinct variant.
Finally, we discuss our usage of Presburger arithmetic as a generalization of ILPs. Solving ILPs amounts
to deciding ∃x : Ax ≤ b; by Lenstra’s algorithm [Len83] and its improvements by Kannan [Kan87] and
Frank and Tardos [FT87], this task is fixed-parameter tractable parameterized by the dimension of x even
for unbounded ‖A,b‖∞ and if A has polynomially (in the length of the input) many rows. In 1990, Kannan
claimed to show that Parametric ILP, which amounts to deciding ∀b ∈ Q ∃x : Ax ≤ b for some
polyhedron Q, is fixed-parameter tractable parameterized by the dimension of x; here, ‖A‖∞ must be
bounded by a polynomial and the number of rows of A also has to be a parameter. However, Kannan’s result
relies on Kannan’s Partitioning Theorem (KPT), which was recently disproved by Nguyen and Pak [NP17].
Nguyen and Pak [NP17, Theorem 1.9] state that Woods [Woo15] gave a polynomial-time algorithm for
deciding ∀y∃x : Φ(x,y) when the dimensions of x and y are constant ; however, it is unclear if this is a fixed-
parameter algorithm. For this reason, as we have the dimensions of x and y as (non-constant) parameter,
we chose to prove Theorem 1 as a slightly weaker result (still sufficient for our purposes) but using only
elementary techniques.
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